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 Health Care Competition Law in the Shadow of State Action: 
Minimizing MACs 
David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic* 
Abstract 
How should we go about reconciling competition and consumer protection 
in health care, given the long shadow cast by the state action doctrine?  We 
consider that issue, using a case study drawn from an obscure corner of the 
pharmaceutical reimbursement market to motivate and inform our analysis. 
We show how the balance between competition and consumer protection 
has been distorted by the political economy of health care regulation –
compounded by the extension of the state action doctrine far past its 
defensible borders.  If anything, considerations of political economy argue 
for much greater skepticism about the utility of regulation – and of the state 
action doctrine -- in the health care space.  
* Hyman is H. Ross and Helen Workman Chair in Law and Professor of Medicine at
the University of Illinois.  Beginning January, 2017, he will be a Professor of Law at 
Georgetown University.  From 2001-2004, he served as Special Counsel at the Federal 
Trade Commission.   
In 2015, Hyman was retained by PCMA, the trade association for PBMs, to prepare a 
white paper on the competitive consequences of attempts by various states to regulate 
MACs.  That initial white paper - along with a subsequent version - provide the basis of our 
analysis in Part IV.  Hyman was also retained by PCMA’s outside counsel in 2015 to serve 
as an expert in litigation involving challenges to attempts by Iowa and Arkansas to regulate 
MACs.  
Kovacic is Visiting Professor, King’s College London, Global Competition Professor 
of Law and Policy, George Washington University Law School, and Non-Executive 
Director, United Kingdom Competition and Markets Authority. From 2006 to 2011, he 
served as a member of the Federal Trade Commission and chaired the agency from March 
2008 to March 2009.  The views expressed here are the authors’ alone.  
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Attempting to protect competition by focusing solely on 
private restraints is like trying to stop the flow of water at a 
fork in a stream by blocking only one of the channels.  
Unless you block both channels, you are not likely to even 
slow, much less stop, the flow.  Eventually, all the water will 
flow toward the unblocked channel.  The same is true of 
antitrust enforcement.  If you create a system in which 
private price fixing results in a jail sentence, but 
accomplishing the same objective through government 
regulation is always legal, you have not completely 
addressed the competitive problem.  You have simply 





George Bernard Shaw famously observed that “all professions are 
conspiracies against the laity.”2  In health care, the bill of particulars is long 
and distinguished, and includes overt price-fixing; attacks on salaried 
practice and pre-paid health care; and the systematic marginalization and 
exclusion of competitors.3  Indeed, Professors Havighurst and King 
accurately note that the entire history of medical care in the United States is 
a story in which “outbreaks of . . . competition were ruthlessly suppressed. . 
. .”4  Of course, these campaigns were waged in the name of “medical 
science, quality of care, and professional prerogative,” rather than the naked 
                                                
1 Timothy J. Muris, State Intervention/State Action – A U.S. Perspective, Remarks at 
the Fordham Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law & Policy (Oct. 24, 2003), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/state-
intervention/state-action-u.s.perspective/fordham031024.pdf. 
2 George Bernard Shaw, The Doctors Dilemma (1909).  The play was first staged in 
1906.   
3 See David A. Hyman, When and Why Lawyers Are the Problem, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 
267 (2008).  See also Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, Improving 
Health Care: A Dose of Competition (2004), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf, published commercially as 
Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition, 10 Developments in Health Economics 
and Public Policy (Springer, 2005); Federal Trade Commission, Overview of FTC 
Antitrust Actions in Health Care Services and Products, Mar. 2013, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/competition-policy-
guidance/hcupdate.pdf   
4 Clark C. Havighurst & Nancy M. P. King, Private Credentialing of Health Care 
Personnel:  An Antitrust Perspective—Part Two, 9 AM. J. L. & MED. 263, 291 (1983).  
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self-interest of the medical profession.5  But, regardless of the external 
branding, the effect was the same: the medical profession was able to set the 
terms of trade, and exclude or substantially limit the authorized scope of 
practice for new entrants.6  Emboldened by these successes, other health 
care providers used similar tactics to protect their turf and set the terms of 
trade.  
In health care, private individuals and entities were the first movers, but 
those involved quickly recognized the value of enlisting the government in 
their conspiracies against the laity.  Compared to privately-imposed 
restraints on trade, governmental restraints “are more effective and efficient, 
and include a built-in cartel enforcement mechanism.”7  And, as we detail 
below, governmentally imposed restraints are much harder to attack than 
private restraints.   
The consequences of these dynamics were quite predictable.  Over time, 
the health care marketplace became enmeshed in a complex web of inter-
locking public and private restraints of trade.  Not coincidentally, health 
care spending, and the rate of spending growth spiraled upward.    
For these and other reasons, health care became a target-rich 
environment for antitrust enforcers beginning in the early 1970s.8  Indeed, 
several generations of enforcement personnel at the Federal Trade 
Commission cut their teeth on merger reviews and cases involving every 
conceivable participant in the health care sector, including hospitals, 
doctors, pharmaceutical companies, and pharmacy benefit managers 
(“PBMs.”)9  As we noted in a recent article: 
5 Id. 
6 Id (concluding the medical profession “was able to repel most attacks along its 
borders, to force many of its antagonists into alliances, and to confine other would-be 
invaders to narrow enclaves.”) 
7 David A. Hyman & Shirley Svorny, If Professions are Just “Cartels By Another 
Name,” What Should We Do About It? 163 U. PENN. L. REV. ONLINE, available at 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review_online/vol163/iss1/7.  
8 We explore the FTC’s decision to focus on health care markets in William E. 
Kovacic & David A. Hyman, Consume or Invest: 
What Do/Should Agency Leaders Maximize?, 91 WASH L. REV. 295 (2016).  
9 See e.g., FTC-DOJ, supra note 3; See also FTC, supra note 3; William Blumenthal, A 
Primer on the Application of Antitrust Law to the Professions in the United States, Sep. 29, 
2006, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/primer-application-
antitrust-law-professions-united-states/20060929cbablumenthalmaterials_0.pdf; John E. 
Kwoka, Jr., The Federal Trade Commission and the Professions: A Quarter Century of 
Accomplishment and Some New Challenges, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 997 (2005). 
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Since the 1970s, the FTC has devoted considerable effort to 
health care, beginning with a major case challenging 
restrictions on advertising in the medical profession, and 
then going on from there to bring cases involving every 
aspect of the health care delivery system.  In health care, the 
FTC has batted through its entire rotation of policy tools, 
including numerous cases, rulemaking, advisory opinions, 
hearings, and competition advocacy. More than any other 
program, the health care program has paid the rent for the 
FTC’s charter as a competition authority.10 
 
The Department of Justice Antitrust Division and state Attorneys General 
have also been active in this space, albeit on a less continuous basis than the 
FTC. 
The campaign against anti-competitive practices within the health care 
sector has had its ups and downs, but it is clear that it has had an impact on 
the frequency and severity of privately imposed anti-competitive 
restraints.11  The picture for publicly imposed restraints is considerably 
murkier, because such restraints are effectively insulated from substantive 
antitrust scrutiny, as long as they qualify as state action – no matter how 
overtly anti-competitive they are, and no matter how flimsy their supposed 
justification.  And, in health care, there is no shortage of overtly anti-
competitive restraints, imposed on the basis of flimsy or non-existent 
evidence, at the behest of politically connected special interests.  
These dynamics complicate the already complex process of reconciling 
competition and consumer protection in health care – since much of what is 
styled as consumer protection is, in fact, provider protection.  The same 
dynamics also argue in favor of re-examining the appropriate boundaries of 
the state action doctrine.  
We examine these issues using a case study drawn from an obscure 
corner of the pharmaceutical reimbursement market -- maximum allowable 
cost (“MAC”) schedules.  Medicaid and PBMs use MACs to reimburse 
pharmacies for dispensing generic drugs.  MACs were pioneered by state 
Medicaid programs, and then adopted by PBMs.  But, in the past few years, 
MACs have become the focal point of heated controversies between PBMs 
                                                
10 Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 7. 
11 Plus, in yet another example of demand creating supply, there is now a thriving 
health care antitrust private bar, along with the requisite ABA section, AHLA practice 
group, and numerous opportunities to obtain CLE credits for attending health care antitrust 
conferences in glamorous locales.  
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and pharmacies – triggering legislative action in 38 states (including Puerto 
Rico).  Although the dispute is invariably cast in terms of consumer 
protection (framed in terms of patients’ ability to access to pharmacy 
services), our case study makes it clear that the issue is really about 
protecting the providers of pharmacy services from the disruptive forces of 
competition.   
Part II lays out some of the complexities of reconciling competition and 
consumer protection in health care.  Part III reviews the basics of the state 
action doctrine.  Part IV presents our case study of MACs.  Part V sketches 
out some suggestions on how to improve matters – both for MACs, and for 
the larger set of issues for which MACs are a stand-in.  Part VI concludes.   
    
II. RECONCILING COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION IN 
HEALTH CARE 
How should we think about reconciling competition and consumer 
protection in health care?  The preconditions for perfectly competitive 
markets (including no barriers to entry or exit; fungible goods; and perfect 
information) are obviously not applicable to health care.  And, in health 
care, we combine high stakes, profound asymmetries of information, and 
deep moral opposition to acknowledging the existence of resource 
constraints.      
Because of the felt necessities created by these dynamics, health care is 
a field dominated by regulation.  The laundry list of regulations includes 
strict restrictions on entry (i.e., licensure, accreditation, certificates of 
need/public necessity, and restrictions on scope of practice); specification of 
minimum terms of trade (mandated benefits, any willing providers, voiding 
of liability waivers); and aggressive ex post enforcement (hospital 
privileges proceedings; state disciplinary action, and medical malpractice 
litigation).  Each and every one of these regulatory initiatives is sold on the 
basis that they are absolutely necessary consumer protections – and the 
alternative is an unregulated market, that would operate “as a savage war of 
all against all, red in tooth and claw, populated solely by charlatans and 
snake oil vendors.”12   
Most of the health law professoriate is perfectly fine with this extensive 
list of anti-competitive restraints.  Indeed, if anything, the health law 
professoriate has devoted most of its time to identifying and cataloging new 
ways in which health care markets can be further tamed or supplanted 
entirely with regulations.  (In fairness, that attitude and approach is 
                                                
12 Hyman & Svorny, supra note 7.   
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inextricably linked to the general political commitments of the law 
professoriate, and is not unique to professors that focus on health law).  But, 
for the sake of argument, let’s assume that there is a constituency that might 
be open to arguments in favor of striking an actual balance between 
competition and consumer protection, rather than simply assuming that 
anything and everything that emerges from the legislative and regulatory 
process is a-ok.  What would that argument look like?   
The argument would begin by noting that markets have developed 
plenty of strategies for signaling and evaluating quality in health care.13  It 
would also observe that competition is itself a powerful tool for protecting 
consumers; legislators are poorly informed under the best of circumstances 
(and health policy is never made under the best of circumstances); and that 
legislators and regulators don’t have anywhere near the right incentives to 
arrive at optimal policy solutions.14  That said, the most entertaining 
argument for skepticism about the merits and distributional consequences of 
legislative/regulatory intervention was cuttingly stated by P.J. O’Rourke:  
When government does, occasionally, work, it works in an 
elitist fashion.  That is, government is most easily 
manipulated by people who have money and power already.  
This is why government benefits usually go to people who 
don't need benefits from government.  Government may 
make some environmental improvements, but these will be 
improvements for rich bird-watchers.  And no one in 
government will remember that when poor people go bird-
watching they do it at Kentucky Fried Chicken.15 
 
Stated differently, in the health care space, governmental action “generally 
favors the concentrated interests of incumbent providers and hurts, rather 
than helps, consumers.”16  Given the unsavory alliance of Bootleggers and 
Baptists that are seemingly required to trigger regulatory action in the health 
care space, any protection of consumers is likely to be incidental/accidental 
at best.17  Accordingly, absent proof to the contrary, we should not pretend 
                                                
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 P.J. O’ROURKE, ALL THE TROUBLE IN THE WORLD: THE LIGHTER SIDE OF FAMINE, 
PESTILENCE, DESTRUCTION AND DEATH 199 (1994). 
16  See David A. Hyman, Getting the Haves to Come out Behind: Fixing the 
Distributive Injustices of American Health Care, 69 L. Contemp. Probs. 265 (2006).  See 
also David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What’s Wrong With A Patient Bill of 
Rights, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 221(2000).    
17 Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect, 22 REGULATION 3 (1999), 
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv22n3/bootleggers.pdf (“[D]urable 
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or assume that health care legislation or regulation actually does much of 
anything to protect consumers – or was ever intended to do so.18   
With that unpleasant framing clearly established, we now turn to the 
state action doctrine, which significantly limits the ability of antitrust 
enforcers to attack publicly-imposed restraints on competition.    
III. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 
Federalism requires that we decide whether, when, and how states can 
deviate from the dictates of federal law.  In antitrust, the Supreme Court has 
developed and applied the state action doctrine, which gives states broad 
discretion to override the commands of federal law.19  States may enact 
legislation that contradicts the federal antitrust laws and immunizes private 
actors from antitrust challenge, so long as the state satisfies two 
conditions.20  The state must clearly articulate its purpose to suppress 
rivalry.21  And the state must actively supervise implementation of the 
anticompetitive regime.22  
These requirements have tripped up some of the more clumsy attempts 
to use the power of the state to restrict competition.23  But, for those who 
are able to follow (fairly simple) directions, the path to a government-
enforced cartel is well marked – and health care providers have taken full 
advantage of the invitation to clothe their anti-competitive behavior in the 
protective garb of state action doctrine.  Worse still, courts have shown 
themselves quite willing to accept even far-fetched invocations of the state 
action doctrine – although there has been a welcome trend toward a more 
                                                                                                                       
social regulation evolves when it is demanded by both of two distinctly different groups. 
‘Baptists point to the moral high ground and give vital and vocal endorsement of laudable 
public benefits promised by a desired regulation . . . . ‘Bootleggers’ who expect to profit 
from the very regulatory restrictions desired by Baptists, grease the political machinery 
with some of the expected proceeds.”). 
18 Hyman, Getting the Haves, supra note 16, at 279 (“to date, provider capture of state 
and federal legislators and regulators is the rule, and the results have not been pretty.  
Indeed, the status quo. . . is the direct result of regulatory and legislative oversight, with its 
known susceptibility to symbolic blackmail, “motherhood and apple pie” initiatives, and 
other forms of government failure.”)  
19 The doctrine originated in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), which rejected a 
claim that a state-approved scheme to prorate raisin production in California violated the 
Sherman Act’s ban on monopolization and conspiracies to monopolize.   
20 California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 99 
(1980).  
21 FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 1003 (2013). 
22 North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 135 S.Ct. 1101 (2015). 
23 In re South Carolina State Board of Dentistry, 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/0210128/south-carolina-state-board-
dentistry-matter .     
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restrictive application of the doctrine in recent years.24   
We now turn to our case study, drawn from the depths of the 
pharmaceutical market.    
IV. PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETS AND MACS 
Pharmaceuticals come in two varieties: branded and generic.  Branded 
drugs capture most of the media attention, and are responsible for a heavily 
disproportionate share of drug spending -- but generic prescriptions account 
for more than 85% of filled prescriptions.25  Generic drugs are significantly 
cheaper than branded drugs – but in recent years, generic drug prices have 
trended upward – sometimes sharply.26  Like any other product, generic 
drug pricing is affected by both supply-side and demand-side factors.27   
How much should pharmacies be paid for dispensing pharmaceuticals – 
and on what basis?  That problem has vexed insurers, PBMs, state Medicaid 
programs, and health policy experts for decades.  In most markets, list 
prices provide a reasonable starting point (if not the actual benchmark) for 
gauging the amount that must be paid to acquire a product.  But, as we 
detail below, matters in pharmaceutical markets are considerably more 
complex – in part because of the product life cycle of generic drugs, and in 
part because of competition within the pharmaceutical supply chain.  As 
such, using list prices virtually ensures that pharmacies will be overpaid – 
sometimes substantially so – for dispensing drugs.  Considerable evidence 
indicates that payers have been overpaying for prescription drugs (both 
branded and generic) for decades. We focus in this article on generic drugs.  
We begin with a brief description of the life-cycle of generic drugs, and of 
the nature of competition within the pharmaceutical supply chain.   
A. Pricing and the Life Cycle of Generic Drugs  
A generic pharmaceutical’s life cycle typically starts with a 180-day 
period of marketing exclusivity, which is granted to the first generic 
                                                
24 Compare FTC, Report of the FTC State Action Task Force, Sep. 2003, at 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/report-state-action-
task-force/stateactionreport.pdf with Phoebe Putney, supra note 21.      
25 Aria A. Razmaria, Generic Drugs, 315 JAMA 2746 (2016).   
26 Dennis Thompson, U.S. Prices Soaring for Some Generic Drugs, Experts Say, U.S. 
News, Nov. 12, 2014; Victoria Colliver, Prices Soar For Some Generic Drugs, San 
Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 1, 2014, at http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/Prices-soar-for-
some-generic-drugs-5105538.php.    
27 Of late, there has been a significant run-up in the cost of some generic drugs.  See 
Jonathan D. Alpern, William M. Stauffer, and Aaron S. Kesselheim, High-Cost Generic 
Drugs — Implications for Patients and Policymakers, 371 New Engl. J. Med. 1859 (2014) 
(“Numerous factors may cause price increases for non–patent-protected drugs, including 
drug shortages, supply disruptions, and consolidations within the generic-drug industry.”)   
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approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).28  During this 180-
day period, the first-approved generic competes only with the brand name 
version of the product and any “authorized generics” that the brand 
manufacturer either makes itself or allows on the market through licensing 
agreements.  
If only one generic is available during the 180-day period, pharmacies 
can typically acquire the drug for about 20% less than the brand price.29  If 
“authorized generics” are also available, the competition is greater -- so the 
pharmacy’s acquisition cost may be 30% less than the brand price.30  Drug 
wholesalers also seek to negotiate discounts – which can be as high as 40-
50% when an authorized generic is available.31  In a competitive market, 
these discounts will be passed on to pharmacies.  However, the list price 
does not typically reflect the impact of these discounts, or it significantly 
lags the impact of these discounts.   
Once the 180-day exclusivity period ends, the market is open to any 
generic approved by the FDA, and dramatic savings can result if many 
generics enter the market, as will happen for highly prescribed 
medications.32  Again, the list price typically does not reflect the impact of 
these price drops, or it significantly lags the impacts of these price declines.   
After 1-2 years, the market for a particular generic drug typically 
matures.  Some manufacturers may exit due to low margins or an eroding 
market for the drug, or as newer medications in the same class also become 
available in generic form.33  Mergers can also reduce the number of 
manufacturers producing a particular drug.  As the number of drug 
manufacturers declines, prices may increase.  Prices may also increase in 
the event of shortages, whether due to manufacturing problems or 
interruptions in the supply of an active ingredient.  Other generic drug 
manufacturers cannot respond to price increases by entering the market, 
unless they have FDA approval – and it can be time-consuming to obtain 
that approval.  Once again, the list price generally does not reflect the 
                                                
28 To secure this marketing exclusivity, the generic drug company must also file what 
is known as a “paragraph IV certification.” This document indicates that the generic drug 
company believes any applicable patents are either invalid or will not be infringed.  
29 Fein, A.J., 2014-15 Economic Report on Retail, Mail, and Specialty Pharmacies, 
Drug Channels Institute, January 2015, at 129. 
30 Id at 129-130. 
31 Id. at 130. 
32 For example, after the 180-day exclusivity period ended for the first generic version 
of the Lexapro (a popular anti-depressant), eleven additional generics were approved by the 
FDA.  The additional competition drove the price per 10 mg pill down from $2.63 to $0.16 
within a month -- a 94% decrease.  Id. at 130-131.    
33 Id. at 131. 
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impact of this pricing volatility, or it significantly lags the impact of these 
price changes. 
B. Pricing and Supply Chain Competition 
Wholesalers routinely offer discounts to pharmacies.  The most 
common discount is for prompt payment – but wholesalers may also 
provide discounts to pharmacies that purchase a minimum quantity of 
generic drugs.  Alternatively, wholesalers can provide discounts on brand 
name drugs as long as the pharmacy purchases a minimum volume of 
generic drugs.  Drug wholesalers offer these incentives because they earn a 
disproportionate share of their profits from generics; in 2014, generics 
generated 16% of their revenue but 75% of their profits.34  
To enhance their negotiating leverage, independent pharmacies often 
join together in buying groups (“PSAOs”) to concentrate their purchases 
with one or more preferred vendors. In exchange for the PSAO selecting a 
wholesaler as its preferred vendor, the wholesaler may agree to provide 
discounts on the group’s consolidated purchases. Some of these discounts 
may be paid as a quarterly rebate based on the aggregate volume of generics 
purchased by the group.35  None of these discounts and rebates are typically 
reflected in the list prices for generics – and they also may not be reflected 
in the invoice associated with the drug purchase.  
C. The Origins of MAC 
When Medicaid was launched, it sought to pay providers their actual 
and justifiable costs – and not one penny more.  MACs emerged in the 
Medicaid program as a tool to do just that – i.e., to set pharmaceutical 
spending at the minimum amount necessary to obtain the drug in question.  
State and federal regulations govern the amount that Medicaid can 
reimburse for prescription drugs.  Before MACs were developed, 
reimbursement generally involved paying the lesser of the estimated 
acquisition cost (EAC) plus a reasonable dispensing fee, or the providers’ 
usual and customary charges to the general public.  The EAC was typically 
determined based on published list prices – including the Average 
Wholesale Price (“AWP”).   
At one time, the AWP reflected pharmacy’s acquisition costs, but, it 
quickly became apparent that there was considerable divergence between 
the AWP and pharmacists’ true acquisition cost, particularly when generic 
drugs became more prevalent.  Once this became clear, it was necessary to 
modify Medicaid’s reimbursement formula, to ensure the amounts paid 
                                                
34 Id. at 113. 
35 Id. at 112. 
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reflected pharmacists’ actual costs (i.e., the acquisition cost plus the costs 
associated with dispensing the pharmaceutical).  
In 1987, the federal government responded by requiring states to 
implement an aggregate payment limit for specific drugs.36  The payment 
limit (known as a “FUL,” for “Federal Upper Limit”) was determined 
mechanically.37  Pursuant to this payment limit, the dispensing pharmacy 
was paid a flat amount for acquiring the dispensed drug, irrespective of its 
actual acquisition cost.  However, some state Medicaid program directors 
believed they were still overpaying for many drugs.  Those states responded 
by adopting MAC programs, which were similar to FULs, but applied to a 
far broader array of drugs, and set lower reimbursement levels.38  Medicaid 
MACs are calculated based on aggregate figures that reflect pharmacies’ 
average acquisition cost for a given pharmaceutical product.  As of January 
12, 2012, all states used FULs and approximately 45 states used MACs in 
their Medicaid programs.39    
D. Private-Sector Use of MACs  
PBMs use contracts to create pharmacy networks.  Approximately 95% 
of the nation’s retail pharmacies are included in one or more PBM 
pharmacy networks.  A pharmacy that joins a network agrees to accept the 
terms in their contract (often called a participating pharmacy agreement 
(“PPA”). The PPA specifies how pharmacies will be reimbursed, details the 
nature of any MACs that may apply, and spells out the process for resolving 
disputes.  Pharmacies are free to decline to contract with an insurer/PBM 
for whatever reason they choose – including inadequate reimbursement, 
uncertainty about the level of reimbursement, or the “hassle factor” of 
dealing with a particular insurer/PBM. 
In designing and implementing a PPA, the PBM must balance two 
competing goals: it wants to ensure a broad network of pharmacies at which 
prescriptions may be filled (since ease of access to covered services is one 
of the “products” the PBM is selling to payers), but it also has to control the 
                                                
36 42 C.F.R. sec. 447.301 et seq. 
37  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”) modified the formula 
for calculating a payment limit. The federal government is still in the process of 
implementing this change.  For an estimate of the impact of these changes, see Office of 
Inspector General, Analyzing Changes to Medicaid Federal Upper Limit Amounts (Oct. 
2012), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-11-00650.pdf.    
38 Richard G. Abramason et al, Generic Drug Cost Containment in Medicaid: Lessons 
from Five State MAC Programs, 25 Health Care Financing Review 25 (2004).  
39 Office of Inspector General, Medicaid Drug Pricing in State Maximum Allowable 
Cost Programs (August 29, 2013), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-11-
00640.asp.   
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cost of the covered services (since low cost is also one of the “products” the 
PBM is selling).  If a PBM errs in one direction (i.e., through overly 
generous payments for pharmaceuticals), it will ensure a broad network of 
pharmacies, but the covered services will be less affordable – meaning the 
PBM may not get the business for which it is bidding.  Conversely, if the 
PBM errs in the other direction (i.e., through inadequate payment for 
pharmaceuticals, excessive hassle factor or DIR fees, and the like), 
pharmacies will decline to contract; will drop out of the PBMs’ network; or 
will refuse to stock pharmaceuticals for which the MAC payment is 
insufficient.  Employers and employees will not value a pharmacy network 
that is too limited along any of these dimensions – meaning the PBM may 
not get the business for which it is bidding.   
When properly designed, MACs help PBMs steer a middle-ground 
between these two extremes.  By paying the average acquisition costs 
incurred by a well-run pharmacy, MACs create the necessary incentive for 
pharmacies to purchase and dispense the lowest-priced generics that are 
available in the market.  Of course, periodic adjustments are necessary to 
deal with unanticipated or extraordinary circumstances, but market forces 
serve to discipline over-reaching by all involved parties (i.e., pharmacies, 
PBMs, and employers/employee benefit plans).  
E. The Effect of MACs: A Dose of Theory 
What are the effects of including a MAC in a PPA?  MACs have had at 
least five distinct effects.  First, MACs encourage pharmacies to dispense 
the generic version of applicable pharmaceuticals.  Second, MACs heighten 
competition among generic manufacturers.  Third, MACs help ensure that 
pharmacies are not being overpaid for the services they provide.  Fourth, 
MACs lower spending on pharmaceutical benefits, thereby reducing the 
cost of prescription drug coverage.  Finally, MACs make prescription drug 
reimbursement more efficient. 
1. Incentivizing Pharmacies to Dispense Generics 
When pharmacies are only paid the amount specified in the MAC, they 
have a substantially increased incentive to acquire and dispense generic 
drugs.40  This dynamic means that a MAC will increase the share of generic 
drugs that are dispensed, compared to a pure cost-based reimbursement 
system.  In the absence of a MAC, the pharmacy’s incentives are quite 
different, since it will be paid based on a list price that often bears little 
                                                
40 Id. at 5 (“Because pharmacy reimbursement is based on a single MAC price 
(regardless of whether a generic or brand version of a drug is dispensed), the program 
creates a financial incentive to substitute lower-cost generic equivalents for their brand-
name counterparts.”)  
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resemblance to the actual acquisition cost.  Under those circumstances (i.e., 
absent a MAC), a pharmacy that dispenses a higher-priced drug (i.e., the 
brand name version) will actually be paid more – increasing the cost of 
providing prescription drug benefits, without providing any commensurate 
benefits.    
2. Increasing Competition Among Generic Manufacturers 
When pharmacies only receive the amount specified in the MAC, they 
have an increased incentive to “shop for the best deal,” and find generic 
drugs at the lowest possible price (since they get to keep the difference 
between the acquisition price and the MAC).  This heightens price 
competition among generic drug manufacturers and drug wholesalers, who 
know that offering lower-priced generics will help drive more sales.   
Absent a MAC, pharmacies have much less incentive to buy the lowest-
cost generic, since their reimbursement is based on the list price (which, as 
noted above, often bears little relationship to the acquisition cost).   Under 
those circumstances, pharmacies will predictably seek to maximize the 
difference between the list price and their actual cost, rather than simply 
buying the lowest-cost generic.   
3. Ensuring Pharmacies Are Not Overpaid 
Cost-based reimbursement can lead to various forms of gaming that 
result in excess payments to pharmacies.  For example, pharmacies have an 
incentive to dispense higher-priced drugs, particularly if they are paid a 
percentage mark-up on their incurred costs.  MACs help prevent this 
behavior, and ensure that the requisite services are obtained at a level 
consistent with actual costs.    
4. Lowering Prescription Drug Spending – and the Cost of 
Prescription Drug Coverage 
When we combine the first three effects with the lower price at which 
generics are dispensed, it becomes clear that MACs help lower prescription 
drug spending – which in turn reduces the cost of prescription drug 
coverage.  In an analysis of Medicaid MACs, the HHS Office of Inspector 
General (“OIG”) concluded that MACS had “significant value” in 
“containing Medicaid drug costs.”41  The OIG also noted that if all states 
adopted the strictest MAC program then in use in 2011, generic drug 
spending would decline by more than 20% in fourteen states, and total 
                                                
41 Id. at 21 (“Our findings demonstrate the significant value MAC programs have in 
containing Medicaid drug costs.”) 
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Medicaid pharmaceutical spending would have been $966 million lower.42 
5. Enhanced Market Efficiency 
Each drug manufacturer has its own unique list price for every dosage 
and variation of each drug that they sell.  As discussed previously, these list 
prices vary widely, and bear little relationship to pharmacies’ actual 
acquisition cost.  A MAC cuts through the forest of individual list prices, 
and specifies the reimbursement that will be paid, regardless of the list price 
and the actual acquisition cost.  Payers need not inquire into the specifics of 
individual transactions, and instead simply pay the standardized amount.  
By eliminating the need to conduct individualized assessments, MACs help 
lower transaction costs and structure the market more efficiently, thereby 
improving system performance.     
F. Legislative Efforts 
In the last three years, thirty-eight states have adopted MAC-related 
legislation.43  We provide a list of these states and the associated statutes in 
the appendix.  Inter alia, these statutes require public disclosure of each 
PBMs’ MACs and the methodology for arriving at the amounts that will be 
paid; limit the circumstances in which MACs may be used (i.e., by 
requiring a certain number of A-rated equivalents); require the submission 
of proprietary information regarding MACs to public authorities; specify 
particular methods and time-frames for MAC appeals and payment 
adjustments, including requiring retroactive payments; and in a few 
instances require PBMs to reimburse the actual acquisition costs that are 
incurred, even if a cheaper alternative was available in the marketplace.  
G. Likely Effects of MAC Legislation 
From a competition law perspective, none of these initiatives are likely 
to improve the performance of the pharmaceutical market, and most seem 
quite likely to make things worse.  First, restrictive state-specific criteria 
undermine the flexibility of PBMs to develop and implement MACs.  
Mandatory public disclosure of MACs and the specifics of the underlying 
methodologies are unlikely to benefit consumers, since both will probably 
lead to less intensive competition and higher prices.44  Requiring specific 
                                                
42 Id.  Wyoming’s MAC program resulted in the greatest aggregate savings.   
43 In addition, federal legislation was proposed, but was not enacted.  S. 867, 113th 
Cong. (2013-2014), at https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/867.    
44 In pharmaceutical markets, the intensity of competition is a function of various 
factors, including the ability of PBMs to obtain a competitive advantage by developing 
more effective MACs.  Forced disclosure of MAC methodologies may undermine PBMs’ 
incentive to invest in such efforts (since other PBMs will be able to free-ride).  In that 
environment, PBMs will be less likely to innovate  – meaning that MACs will be less 
effective than they could be.  Stated differently, compelled disclosure can create a risk to 
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methods and timeframes for MAC appeals and payment adjustments—
including requiring “retroactive” payments—is also likely to have 
unintended effects.  Such provisions seem likely to result in administrative 
complexity and unpredictability, which will in turn result in increased costs.   
The provisions which require PBMs to pay at least actual acquisition 
costs are particularly pernicious.  The inflationary consequences of cost-
based reimbursement are well known, and help explain why such 
reimbursement schemes have fallen into disfavor in health care.45  The same 
dynamic has played out in the context of government procurement.46  The 
                                                                                                                       
competition, which is likely to result in higher prices for consumers. 
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has studied these issues, and issued three 
detailed advocacy letters in 2004, 2006, and 2011 on the impact of mandated disclosure of 
PBM contract terms.  See Letter from FTC staff to Rep. Mark Formby (March 22, 2011), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/policy/policy-actions/advocacy-filings/2011/03/ftc-staff-
letter-honorable-mark-formby-mississippi; Letter from FTC staff to Rep. Terry G. Kilgore 
(October 2, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/V060018.pdf; Letter from FTC staff 
to Rep. Greg Aghazarian (Sept. 7, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/V040027.pdf.   
The FTC and Department of Justice also issued a lengthy joint report on health care 
and competition policy in 2004 that discussed these issues, and a report in 2005 that 
provided extensive information on PBM operations.  See Improving Health Care, supra 
note 3; Federal Trade Commission, Pharmacy Benefit Managers: Ownership of Mail-
Order Pharmacies (Aug. 2005), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/pharmbenefit05/050906pharmbenefitrpt.pdf.  To be sure, the 
FTC was studying a different set of issues, but the risks to competition of compelled 
transparency are analogous.  One of us (Hyman) was a co-author of the 2004 advocacy 
letter, and both of us worked on the FTC-DOJ report.    
45 Prior to 1983, Medicare relied on cost-based reimbursement for inpatient 
hospitalization. Medicare payments were accordingly based on whatever costs the hospital 
incurred – and each hospital had virtually complete freedom to determine its own cost 
structure. The result was entirely predictable: Medicare costs for inpatient treatment 
skyrocketed, as hospitals determined that there were no effective constraints on the 
amounts they could bill, as long as they had legitimately incurred the associated costs.   
After the consequences of cost-based reimbursement became clear, a bipartisan 
consensus in favor of a different payment system emerged.  In 1983, Medicare switched to 
a prospective payment system (“PPS”), which paid a standardized amount, irrespective of 
the actual costs incurred by the hospital.  A small number of hospitals were excluded from 
the PPS.  However, payment for the overwhelming majority of hospitals switched virtually 
overnight from cost-based reimbursement to the PPS.   
Hospitals suddenly had an incentive to pay attention to the costs they incurred for 
treating each patient, instead of simply passing those costs on. Although there have been 
issues with the implementation of PPS, there has been no serious discussion of a return to 
cost-based reimbursement for hospitals.  
46 For many years, the federal government used cost-based procurement for defense 
contracts.  Unfortunately, this approach created little incentive for defense contractors to 
perform in the most efficient way possible, since they knew their costs would be 
reimbursed, however much they were.  Cost-based reimbursement also meant that the 
government assumed most of the risks of performance, because it had agreed to pay the 
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problems with cost-based contracts were well known to defense contractors 
and to Congress.47  Federal procurement regulations now specify that cost-
based reimbursement contracts may only be used when the contracting 
officer certifies that a fixed-price type contract can’t be used.48   
To sum up, restrictions on the use of MACs that push pharmaceutical 
purchasing toward cost-based reimbursement will lead to increases in 
pharmaceutical spending and increases in the cost of prescription drug 
coverage.  The magnitude of these increases are obviously subject to 
considerable uncertainty,49 but the directional effect seems clear.    
                                                                                                                       
contractor its full allowable incurred costs until the job was accomplished, or the contract 
was terminated.  Unsurprisingly, cost-based contracts sometimes resulted in sizeable cost 
over-runs (relative to the originally estimated and budgeted cost) for defense procurement. 
47 A book by then-Representative Henry Waxman concisely summarizes the prevailing 
wisdom on the perils of cost-based reimbursement: 
 
One Halliburton official told us that the company’s mantra was “Don’t 
worry about price. It’s a cost-plus.”  One needn’t be a math wiz to 
understand how quickly this system inflates costs and even gives 
contractors an incentive to run up enormous bills.  
HENRY WAXMAN, THE WAXMAN REPORT: HOW CONGRESS REALLY WORKS (2009). 
48 FAR. 16.301-2, available at 
https://www.acquisition.gov/sites/default/files/current/far/html/Subpart%2016_3.html. 
More specifically, the contracting officer must certify that the circumstances do not allow 
the agency to define its requirements sufficiently to allow for a fixed-price type contract; 
or the uncertainties involved in contract performance do not permit costs to be estimated 
with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed-price contract.  And, when a cost-based 
contract is used, the contracting officer is required to employ appropriate surveillance 
measures, to provide assurance that efficient methods and effective cost controls are in 
place.  FAR 16-301-3(a). 
49 We have located two attempts to “score” the impact of state-level regulation of 
MACs.  One study, done by Visante, estimated that spending on the affected 
pharmaceuticals would increase by 31-56%, with a nationwide impact of $6.2 billion 
increased spending annually.  Visante, Proposed MAC Legislation May Increase Costs Of 
Affected Generic Drugs By More Than 50 Percent, January, 2015, on file with author.  
Importantly, this estimate captures only the immediate fiscal impact, and not the more 
long-term indirect consequences. 
The second study was performed by the Washington Health Care Authority (“WHCA), 
and involved “scoring” the financial impact of proposed legislation that prohibited PBMs 
from paying pharmacies less than their actual acquisition cost. WHCA concluded the 
proposed legislation would make MAC lists much less effective, and would dramatically 
reduce pharmacies’ incentive to acquire generic drugs at the lowest possible cost.  WHCA 
Fiscal Note, SSB – 5857.  Although WHCA did not settle on a single number for the fiscal 
impact of SB 5857, it presented a range of figures, up to and including a 10% increase in 
the cost of pharmaceuticals.  WHCA specifically determined that the legislation would 
“significantly increase” costs for public employee benefits and would also have a cost-
increasing impact on Medicaid.   
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H. How The Empire Struck Back: The Political Economy of MAC 
Legislation 
How did such overtly anti-competitive legislation get enacted in such 
short order, by so many states?  One of the most important insights to 
understanding U.S. health policy is that every dollar of health care spending 
is a dollar of income for some health care provider.50  To the extent MACs 
are effective at reducing pharmaceutical spending on generic drugs, they 
reduce the amounts that pharmacies receive for dispensing those same 
drugs.  Not surprisingly, pharmacists feel aggrieved that their services are 
not being compensated at the handsome level that they believe their 
expertise and professionalism justifies – and they lobby for relief from the 
hardships imposed by competitive markets.   
Pharmacists began these lobbying campaigns with at least three distinct 
advantages.  First, like funeral directors and car dealerships, there are one or 
more pharmacies in every legislative district – many of which are small 
independent pharmacies.  These small independent pharmacies are pillars of 
the local business community.  Second, if a legislator has to pick sides, the 
small independent local pharmacy is a much more appealing entity than a 
large out-of-state PBM.  Third, many legislators believe there is a serious 
problem with access to pharmacy care in rural areas, where most 
pharmacies are small and independent.   
Although chains account for a near-majority of pharmacies in most 
states, the protection of small independent local pharmacies from the 
depredations of large out-of-state PBMs was the basis of the lobbying 
campaign.  The flames were fanned by references to the rebates that PBMs 
were receiving from drug companies.51  Given these dynamics, it is not 
surprising that we went from no states with MAC legislation at the 
beginning of 2013 to thirty-eight states having such legislation only three 
and a half years later. 
Three features of the MAC statutes listed in the Appendix deserve 
further attention.  First, although the legislative campaign was built around 
the protection of independent (mostly rural) pharmacies, state MAC statutes 
were not so limited.  Instead, in all of these jurisdictions, every single 
                                                
50 Hyman, supra note 16, at 280 (noting “the reality that every dollar of health care 
spending by someone is a dollar of income for someone else.”) 
51 These rebates are paid on branded drugs – not generics – so it is difficult to see the 
relevance of this argument to a dispute over whether PBMs are paying pharmacies the right 
amount for dispensing generic drugs.  And, the fact that PBMs may have multiple sources 
of revenue does not translate into an obligation to share any of that revenue with 
pharmacies, unless doing so is necessary to induce the pharmacies to participate in the 
PBM’s network.    
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pharmacy – including chain drugstores in urban locations – receives the 
benefits of the legislation.  That strategy means the legislation is not well 
targeted to address the supposed problem that it is allegedly remedying.  
Stated differently, MAC legislation puts money in the pockets of all 
pharmacies in a state – whether they “need” it or not.  (Need is in quotes 
because the issue is simultaneously an empirical question, and also a matter 
of opinion).   That is an exceedingly peculiar understanding of consumer 
protection – to say the least.    
Second, in thirty-six of the thirty-eight states, the state Medicaid 
program is excluded from the requirements imposed by the MAC 
legislation.52  Many of these states also exclude state employees from the 
“consumer protections” contained in the MAC statutes.  The only thing 
these two groups have in common is that the costs of their health coverage 
are on-budget expenses, borne (either in whole or in part) by the state in its 
sovereign capacity.  By excluding these populations from the scope of 
MAC legislation, state legislators made it clear that they thought that the 
supposed consumer protections were worth doing -- right up until the 
moment the state would bear the costs of doing so.  This pattern is certainly 
not unique to MAC legislation – but it provides a useful (albeit under-
inclusive) signal of legislation that is provider protection masquerading as 
consumer protection.53     
Finally, in some states, the legislative history casts light on whose 
interests are actually being protected.  When Iowa was considering MAC 
legislation, one overly enthusiastic legislator stated that the legislation was 
necessary because the lack of regulation was “eroding local pharmacies.”  
Another Iowa legislator explained that legislation was necessary because 
PBMs were engaging in “unfair business practices that hurt community 
pharmacies and their patients.”  Similarly, when Washington enacted MAC 
legislation, the Office of Insurance Commissioner was instructed to conduct 
a study that would inter alia “discuss suggestions that recognize the unique 
nature of small and rural pharmacies and possible options that support a 
viable business model that do not increase the cost of pharmacy products.”54  
As these examples indicate, MAC legislation is provider protection – not 
consumer protection.   
                                                
52 The exceptions are Mississippi and Texas.    
53 David A. Hyman, Drive-Through Deliveries: Is Consumer Protection Just What the 
Doctor Ordered? 78 N.C. L. Rev. 5 (1999) (noting that majority of the states that enacted 
prohibitions on drive-through deliveries excluded state employees and Medicaid 
beneficiaries from the statute).    
54 Washington S.B. 5857 (2016).   
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I. Some Empirical Evidence 
The legislative campaign against MACs turned on whether pharmacies 
were being paid enough for dispensing generic drugs.  As we summarize 
below, the two sides staked out competing positions on various factual 
matters.    
Pharmacies insisted that PBMs were underpaying them, by setting MAC 
levels too low, and failing to update them quickly enough when acquisition 
costs increased.  Pharmacies argued that the resulting shortfalls in payment 
placed considerable financial pressure on independent pharmacies 
(particularly those in rural areas) – causing closures and more limited access 
to pharmacy services.    
PBMs insisted that they were paying the correct amounts – and 
pharmacies that were losing money on dispensed generic prescriptions were 
either paying higher acquisition costs than they needed to; were mistaken 
about the transactions in question; or did not realize that MACs were 
intended to average out across all the generic prescriptions dispensed by a 
well-run pharmacy, with over-payments on some drugs compensating for 
under-payments on others.   
What do we actually know about these issues (i.e., MAC usage and 
levels, and access to pharmacy services)?  We consider each in turn.           
1. MAC Usage and Levels 
In ongoing research, one of us (Hyman) interviewed personnel at four 
PBMs about their use of MACs.  All four PBMs used MACs for most drugs 
that were available in generic form.  MACs were typically set for each 
generic drug in all of the available dosing strengths.  MAC levels were set 
based on pricing information from various sources, including Medicaid 
MAC and FUL lists; and price lists from wholesalers and other sources 
(e.g., NADAC and Medi-Span).  All four PBMs used this pricing 
information to create their own MAC lists – each using its own proprietary 
methods.  Each PBM maintained multiple MAC lists, which varied 
depending on the contracts with plan sponsors.  Some MAC lists were 
regional, but most were applied on a national basis.  All four PBMs insisted 
that they took account of changes in drug acquisition costs in updating their 
MAC lists – in some instances doing so on a daily basis.     
Each PBM had its own appeals mechanism.  Appeals were triggered 
when a pharmacy submitted documentation confirming that the drug was 
actually dispensed to a PBM customer, and that the MAC was below the 
pharmacy’s actual acquisition cost.  All of the PBMs used the information 
derived from appeals as part of a feedback loop to inform the levels at 
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which MACs were set.  All four PBMs reported that appeals were a small 
(i.e., << 1%) share of total transactions.  
Of course, there are limitations to qualitative studies of this sort.  None 
of those being interviewed were under oath.  MACs are a hot issue, and 
those being interviewed were unlikely to volunteer information that would 
make their PBM-employers look bad.  Qualitative research can tell us how 
PBMs create and maintain their MAC lists – but only quantitative research 
can answer the question of how often PBMs pay pharmacies less (and 
more) than their acquisition cost; how large those deviations actually are; 
whether there are any time trends in these patterns; and whether the drugs in 
question were available for less from a different wholesaler than the one 
used by the pharmacy in question. 
It is exceedingly difficult to conduct such research, since the 
pharmaceutical marketplace is quite dynamic; data from multiple sources is 
required; and all of the PBMs treat their MAC lists as proprietary and 
confidential.  Those difficulties notwithstanding, Washington’s 2016 MAC 
legislation required the Washington Office of Insurance Commissioner to 
conduct a quantitative study of these issues.  The expected completion date 
of the study, which is being conducted by HMA and Mercer, is November, 
2016.  But, regardless of the results of such studies, from an economic 
perspective what matters is whether pharmacies are willing to participate in 
the networks that PBMs have created, and whether those networks are 
acceptable to payers.   
2. Access to Pharmacy Services  
Pharmacists obviously care a great deal about whether their pharmacy 
closes its doors, and whether it is operated by a chain or is independent.  
But, it is less obvious that anyone else should be all that invested in those 
issues.   We should care about whether patients have access to pharmacy 
services – and not nearly as much (if at all) about the specifics of how those 
services are delivered.  And, we should know more about the relevant size 
of the geographic market for pharmacy services before concluding any 
given pharmacy closure is a problem.55   
That said, there is evidence that there have been a material number of 
closures of rural pharmacies.56  But, this trend long pre-dates the recent 
                                                
55 For example, when Illinois was debating tort reform in 2003-2005, it was routinely 
noted that there were no neurosurgeons south of Springfield.  No one ever discussed 
whether we actually should be concerned about the number of neurosurgeons south of 
Springfield – particularly when Carbondale was closer to St. Louis (96 miles) than to 
Springfield (160 miles).   
56 See, e.g., Kelli Todd, Fred Ullrich & Keith Mueller, Rural Pharmacy Closures: 
Implications for Rural Communities, RUPRI Brief No. 2012-5, at https://www.public-
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dispute over MAC levels – and the number of closures was much higher in 
2007-2009, with subsequent trends “not as pronounced or as clear as in 
earlier years.”57  More importantly, a recent study of access to pharmacy 
services for Medicare Part D beneficiaries by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services found that 99% of urban beneficiaries had access to a 
pharmacy within 2 miles; 99% of suburban beneficiaries had access to a 
pharmacy within 5 miles; and 97% of rural beneficiaries had access to a 
pharmacy within 15 miles.58  These findings suggest that pharmacy closures 
have not had a material impact on access to pharmacy services.   
V. DISCUSSION 
A. How Representative are MACs?  
We have presented a single case study.  Readers might well ask whether 
we have cherry-picked a particularly egregious example of rent-seeking to 
justify our conclusions.  We do not believe that our findings are skewed by 
the specific example we have chosen.  In related work, we examine other 
examples of health care regulation, including restrictions on entry (i.e., 
licensure and certificates of need/public necessity) and restrictions on the 
terms for which goods and services may be provided (i.e., mandated 
benefits, any willing provider legislation, and other planks in what used to 
be known as the “patient bill of rights.”)  Our MAC-related findings are 
fully consistent with our findings in this larger research project. 
  Other scholars have reached similar conclusions about health care 
legislation/regulation.59  And there is a rich public choice literature, 
documenting that similar complaints may be lodged at legislation and 
regulation across jurisdictions -- both over time and across substantive areas 
of law and policy.  Whatever else one might want to say in defense of MAC 
statutes, they fit comfortably into a rich tradition, where “the favored 
                                                                                                                       
health.uiowa.edu/rupri/publications/policybriefs/2013/Pharmacist%20Loss%20Brief%2002
2813.pdf  
57 See Fred Ullrich & Keith Mueller, Update: independently owned pharmacy closures 
in rural America, 2003-2013, RUPRI Brief No. 2014-7, at 
http://cph.uiowa.edu/rupri/publications/policybriefs/2014/Pharm%20Closure%20Brief%20
June%202014.pdf.  See also Donald Klepser et al, Independently Owned Pharmacy 
Closures in Rural America, RUPRI Brief No. 2008-2, at 
http://cph.uiowa.edu/rupri/publications/policybriefs/2008/b2008-
2%20Independently%20Owned%20Pharmacy%20Closures.pdf   
58 CMS, Analysis of Part D Beneficiary Access to Preferred Cost Sharing Pharmacies 
(PCSPs) April 28, 2015, at https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Prescription-Drug-
Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/Downloads/PCSP-Key-Results-Report-Final-
v04302015.pdf  
59 See e.g., Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in 
American Health Care, 69 L. Contemp. Probs. 7 (2006).    
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pastime of state and local governments” is the “dishing out [of] special 
economic benefits to certain in-state industries.”60 
 
B. Balance This!  
The symposium at which this article was presented is framed around the 
optimal balance between competition and consumer protection.  That issue 
is obviously difficult and complex – and no one has come up with a perfect 
solution to the problem.  That is why it provides a good subject for a 
symposium.  Balancing competition against provider protection that is 
masquerading as consumer protection is another matter entirely.  That 
problem is easy.61  And, as show in our larger research project, most of 
what passes as consumer protection in health care is, in fact, provider 
protection.  We should stop pretending otherwise.   
C. Implications of Our Analysis for State Action 
Our findings obviously call into question both the scope of the state 
action doctrine and the deference that doctrine gives to the decisions of state 
legislators.  MAC statutes exemplify the degree to which private economic 
actors are willing and able to enlist state authority to obstruct entry or 
otherwise restrict competitive threats to incumbent market participants.62  
And, as noted previously, these efforts make perfect sense.63  The relentless 
expansion of the U.S. criminal enforcement of the Sherman Act’s ban on 
cartelization has created powerful incentives for firms to seek comfort from 
state legislators.64  Privately agree with your competitors to exclude rivals, 
and you may go to jail; get the state to do it for you, and it is the 
competitors who may face a prison sentence for failing to comply.   
State action also has distributional consequences – including spill-over 
anti-competitive effects in other states.  The benefits of MAC legislation are 
captured by in-state pharmacies, but the costs are largely externalized to 
out-of-state PBMs – particularly during the term of lock-in contracts 
between PBMs and payers.65  Previous commentators have noted the 
                                                
60 Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 2004). 
61 See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (“Perhaps the adage about 
hard cases making bad law should be revised to cover easy cases.”) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in the judgment).   
62 The expansion of state licensure requirements is documented in Aaron Edlin & 
Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Occupational Licensing and the Quality of 
Service. 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1093 (2014); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and 
Occupational Licensing, 39 HARV. J. L. & PUBLIC POL’Y 209 (2016). 
63 See supra note 1, and accompanying text.   
64 James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, U.S. Convergence with International 
Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public Restraints on Competition, 90 B.U. L. REV. 
1555, 1561-62 (2010). 
65 PBMs contract with plan sponsors on either a “pass-through” or a “lock-in” basis.  A 
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importance of limiting state action immunity to laws that have little or no 
spillovers into other states.66  Retrenchment of the state action doctrine, and 
closer and more skeptical scrutiny of state-based restrictions on 
competition, would reflect the reality that the limits imposed by one state 
routinely damage the interests of citizens in other states – particularly when 
electronic commerce has diminished the amount of commerce that is truly 
“local.”  
For those who are concerned with distributive (in)justice, health care 
regulation exemplifies the various ways in which “the haves come out 
ahead.”67  Of course, such reverse-Robin Hood schemes are not limited to 
health care.  Many of the state restrictions that have been challenged by the 
DOJ and FTC, whether through litigation or competition advocacy, have 
perverse (i.e., upside-down) distributional effects.68 
Perhaps there is something to be learned from the ways in which other 
countries handle these matters.  Many countries closely scrutinize anti-
competitive state measures, and intervene forcefully to strike them down.69  
Other jurisdictions do allow political subdivisions to restrict competition, 
but they subject such interventions to more demanding standards and more 
frequently invalidate them.70  For example, the European Commission 
places sharp limits on when a jurisdiction can provide “state aid,” including 
an ex ante approval process that is back-stopped by the availability of 
recoupment and restitution.71  These approaches more fully address the 
destructive potential of state curbs on competition than the “nothing to see 
here, move along” approach taken by the U.S. in its implementation of the 
state action doctrine.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
Our proposal is modest.  We should begin by acknowledging two 
simple facts: (i) virtually everything that is billed as “consumer protection” 
                                                                                                                       
lock-in contract obligates the PBM to hit the contractually specified targets throughout the 
contractual term, irrespective of changes in the pharmaceutical market – including changes 
in the amounts that must be paid to dispensing pharmacies because of the effect of state 
MAC statutes.   
66 See, e.g., Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust 
State Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in 
Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV.  1203, 12-17-18 (1997).  
67 See supra note 16, and accompanying text.   
68 Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 64, at 1565. 
69 Eleanor M. Fox & Deborah Healey, When the State Harms Competition – The Role 
for Competition Law, 79 Antitrust L.J. 769 (2014). 
70 Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 64, at 1584-85. 
71 See European Commission, State Aid Control, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/index_en.html  
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in the health care space is actually “provider protection;” and (ii) the state 
action doctrine insulates such conduct, as well as other forms of rent-
seeking from antitrust scrutiny – at least as long as the state can satisfy the 
minimal hurdles created by the clear articulation and active supervision 
requirements.   
The antitrust laws work reasonably well in dealing with private anti-
competitive conduct, but the state action doctrine turns the antitrust laws 
into a goalie that only guards half the net.72  That approach isn’t working, 
and can’t be made to work.  To continue our metaphor, players quickly 
learn to shoot at the unguarded half of the net.73  We should treat provider 
protection as a form of state aid, and use the competition laws to strike 
down a substantially greater share of the rent-seeking statutes that emerge 
from the legislative process.  Of course, the toolkit for fixing these 
problems is not limited to competition law.  The list of “fixes” should also 
include greater public scrutiny; routine-sun-setting; and a healthy dose of 
skepticism about the operations of the administrative state.74  
What about the problem of striking the proper balance between true 
consumer protections and competition?  And, the obligations imposed by 
federalism?  Get back to us once the system has been purged of provider 
protection.  Until then, we all have bigger fish to catch, kill, and fry.    
                                                
72 We leave it up to the reader to decide whether the hypothetical goalie is playing 
hockey, lacrosse, soccer, or water polo.   
73 See Muris, supra note 1 (stating, as a competition policy theorem, the idea that “as a 
competition system achieves success in attacking private restraints, it increases the efforts 
that firms will devote to obtaining public restraints.”) 
74 See Hyman & Svorny, supra note 7.   
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Appendix: States With MAC Statutes  
 
Arkansas: Ark Code Ann § 17-92-507 (2013); S.B. 688 (2015); 
California: A.B. 627 (2015) Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-37-103.5 -
2014; Delaware: HB 284 (2016); Florida: Fla. Stat. Ann. § 465.1862 
(2015); Georgia: H.B. 470 (2015); Hawaii: H.B. 252 (2015); Iowa: Iowa 
Code § 510B.8 (2014); Kansas: SB 103 (2016); Kentucky: Ky. Rev. State. 
Ann. § 304.17A.162 (2013) and SB 117 (2016); Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 22:1863, 22:1864, 22:1865 (2014); Maine: LD 1150 (2016); 
Maryland: Md. Code Ann., Ins. § 15-1628.1 (2014); Minnesota: Minn. Stat.   
§ 151.71 (2014); Missouri: SB 865 (2016); Mississippi: HB 456 (2016); 
Montana: S.B. 211 (2015); New Hampshire: HB 1664 (2016); New Jersey: 
S.B. 2301 (2015); New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59A-61-4 (2014); New 
York: S.B. 3346-2015; North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-56A-5 (2014); 
North Dakota: N.D. Century Code § 19-02.1-14.2-2013; Ohio: Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann.   § 3959.111 (2015); Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 59, §§ 357 
and 360 (2015), and SB 1150 (2016); Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat.§ 735.534 
(2013); Puerto Rico xx (2013); Rhode Island: HB 7483 (2016); South 
Carolina: SB 849 (2016); Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-3102, 56-7-
3106 to 3111 (2014) and SB 1789 (2016); Texas: S.B. 332 (2015) and Tex. 
Govt. Code Ann. § 533.005 (2013); Utah: Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-640 
(2014); Vermont: S.B. 139 (2015); Virginia: Va. Code Ann. § 38-2-
3407.15:3 (2015); Washington: Wash. Rev. Code § 19.340.100 (2014) and 
SB 5857 (2016); Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. § 632.865 (2015); Wyoming: HB 35 
(2016).  
 
 
